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1Reviewing the Function of Criminal Appeals in England 
and Wales
Stephanie Roberts
Recently, there have been considerations for reform of criminal appeals in both England and Wales 
and Jersey. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in England and Wales has been criticised for not 
fulfilling the role intended for it as it has proved to be deficient in identifying and correcting 
miscarriages of justice. Three main reasons have been suggested as to why this occurs and they are 
that the Court has shown too much deference to the jury verdict, undue reverence for the principle of 
finality, and a lack of resources has led to the fear that too many appellants will appeal and the Court 
will not be able to cope. This article acknowledges that these areas have caused problems for the 
Court but it seeks to argue that it was their influence prior to the Court of Criminal Appeal’s creation 
that has caused the problems because it was due to these factors that it was created as a court of 
review. Therefore, this article argues that the Court’s function of review (and not its powers) lies at the 
heart of the problem and this should be considered in any law reform process in England and Wales 
and Jersey.
Introduction
There have been recent considerations in both England and Wales and Jersey to reform the law of 
criminal appeals. In a recent review of the workings of the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the 
House of Commons Justice Committee recommended the Law Commission of England and Wales 
review the Court of Appeal’s powers for allowing an appeal.1 The Government did not act upon this 
recommendation after saying it would consider it2 but a number of academics and organizations 
suggested the Justice Committee recommendation be adopted in response to an open call by the 
Law Commission for suggestions of areas of law reform it should look into. The Law Commission 
agreed this should be taken further after the first sift of submissions and a final decision has yet to be 
made. The Law Commission in Jersey has recently issued a scoping paper with a view to reforming 
the law of criminal appeals in Jersey and the Commission will be issuing a consultation paper in due 
course.3 This article seeks to highlight where the problems lie in criminal appeals and to suggest 
proposals for improving the law in light of these recent calls for reform.
1
 House of Commons Justice Committee, 12th Report – Criminal Cases Review Commission, HC850, 25 March 
2015, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/850/85002.htm, last 
viewed 31 May 2017.
2
 See Government Response to the Justice Select Committee’s Twelfth Report of Session 2014-15, Criminal 
Cases Review Commission, Cmnd 9119 (2015, HMSO, London).
3
 See Jersey Law Commission  Consultation  Paper No. 2/2016/CP, published in July 2016, available at 
https://jerseylawcommission.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/jsylawcom_criminalappeals_cp2_2016.pdf  last 
viewed 31 May 2017.
2It has been stated that there are two main purposes of appeals; the first is the private one of doing 
justice in individual cases by correcting wrong decisions. The second is the public one of engendering 
public confidence in the administration of justice by making those corrections and in clarifying and 
developing the law.4 If this is an accurate assessment of the purposes of appeals, it would appear that 
since the Court of Criminal Appeal5 was created in 1907 in England and Wales, the Criminal Division 
of the Court of Appeal has largely failed on both fronts as the two main criticisms have been its 
deficiencies in identifying and correcting miscarriages of justice, and its inconsistent, unpredictable 
and contradictory decision-making which have been well documented over the years.6 
The Court of Criminal Appeal was primarily created to provide a tribunal for reviewing the findings of 
the jury; this had proved to be a difficult task and it took approximately 31 bills7 over a sixty year 
period before the Court was finally created in 1907. The main protagonists against reform in the 
nineteenth century proved to be the judges and various reports from the period reveal that the judges 
were not opposed to a criminal appeal system as such as the judiciary did not object to their decisions 
being reviewed in relation to sentences or questions of law but were clearly very hostile to an appeal 
system based on errors of fact.8  During the nineteenth century, politicians were generally swayed by 
4
 See Lord Woolf, Access to Justice, Final Report, 1996, 153. Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm, last viewed 25 May 
2017.
5
 The Court of Criminal Appeal became the criminal division of the Court of Appeal in s.1 Criminal Appeal Act 
1966. The use of these terms is dependent on the timeframe discussed.
6
 See, for example,  R. Pattenden,  English Criminal Appeals 1844 – 1994 (1996, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford) 77; R. Nobles and D. Schiff, Understanding Miscarriages of Justice (2000, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford) 83; K. Malleson, “Appeals against Conviction and the Principle of Finality” (1994) Journal of Law and 
Society 151 at 163; K. Malleson, “Miscarriages of Justice and the Court of Appeal” (1993) 109 Law Quarterly 
Review  66; R. Nobles and D. Schiff et al., “The Inevitability of Crisis in Criminal Appeals” (1993) The 
International Journal of the Sociology of  Law 1;  JUSTICE, Miscarriages of Justice (London: Justice, 1989) 
para 4.21; JUSTICE, Criminal Appeals (London: Justice, 1964); M. Knight, Criminal Appeals (1970, Stevens 
and Sons, London) 1; Knight, M (1975) Criminal Appeals Supplement 1969-1973 (1975, Stevens and Sons: 
London); G. Williams, Proof of Guilt, 3rd Ed (1963, Stevens and Sons, London) 330; A. Samuels, “Appeals 
Against Conviction: Reform” (1984) Crim LR, 337; J.R. Spencer, “Criminal Law and Criminal Appeals: The 
Tail That Wags The Dog” (1982) Crim LR, 260; The Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) 
Report, Cmnd 2263 (1993, HMSO, London)  ch 10, para 3; S. Roberts and L. Weathered, “Assisting the 
Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission,” (2009) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43 ; C. McCartney and S. Roberts, “Building 
Institutions to Address Miscarriages of Justice in England and Wales: ‘Mission Accomplished?” (2012) 80 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 1333; C. McCartney and C. Walker, “Criminal Justice and Miscarriages of 
Justice in England and Wales,” Chapter 10 in C. Ronald Huff and Martin Killias (Eds), Wrongful Conviction 
International Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice (2008, Temple University Press, Philadelphia) pp. 183-
211; House of Commons Justice Committee,  op cit, n 1 above; S. Roberts, “Fresh Evidence and Factual 
Innocence in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal” (2017) Journal of Criminal Law (forthcoming); S. 
Roberts, ‘”Unsafe” Convictions: Defining and Compensating Miscarriages of Justice’ (2003) 66(3) Modern Law 
Review 441.
7
 This is an approximate figure because different sources suggest different numbers of bills but this is the figure 
listed in the Return of Criminal Appeal Bills (1906) H.L. 201.
8
 The views of the judges can be ascertained from the evidence given in the following reports: Commissioners 
on Criminal Law, Second Report on the Criminal Law (cmnd. 343, London:HMSO, 1836); Commissioners on 
Criminal Law, Eighth Report on the Criminal Law, Parl Pap, 1845, vol xiv, 161; House of Lords Select 
Committee, Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Administration of the Criminal Law 
(cmnd. 523, London:HMSO, 1848); Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Indictable Offences, Report of 
the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Indictable Offences (cmnd. 2345, London:HMSO, 1879).
3the arguments of the judges and it was also felt that a court of criminal appeal was not needed 
because of the power the Home Secretary had of granting a free pardon, which amounted to a 
declaration of innocence, to rectify injustice.9 This procedure was heavily criticised when its 
inadequacies were revealed by the case of Adolf Beck. Beck had sixteen attempts to have his 
convicted reviewed rejected by the Home Office and when the person who actually committed the 
crimes was caught, the case attracted a large amount of publicity. This case, and a number of others, 
finally persuaded the Government an appeal system for rectifying errors of fact was urgently needed 
to restore public confidence in the criminal justice system. The Court of Criminal Appeal was created 
by the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 and this was the start of a recurring theme of crisis and reform in 
criminal appeals in England and Wales with both the 1968 Criminal Appeal Act and the 1995 Criminal 
Appeal Act enacted after further periods of perceived crisis and high profile miscarriages of justice.
It would appear the judicial hostility to creating the Court had a lasting impact because the main 
difficulties associated with it have stemmed from its function in deciding appeals on factual grounds. 
The general consensus is the judiciary have adopted a restrictive approach to its role of correcting 
miscarriages of justice with too much deference being shown to the jury verdict;10 there has been 
undue reverence for the principle of finality;11 and a lack of resources has led to the fear that the 
floodgates would open and there would be a deluge of applications to appeal which the Court could 
not cope with.12 
Whilst the consensus appears to suggest the Court is too reluctant to quash convictions, it is difficult 
to measure in any meaningful way whether the Court should be quashing more convictions. It is not 
every appeal which should be overturned and the Court needs to find some way of differentiating 
between those appeals which are without merit from those that require the quashing of the conviction. 
9
 A free pardon releases a person from the effect of a penalty or a consequence of a sentence though quashing 
the conviction can only be done by the Court of Appeal. The grant of a free pardon is restricted to cases where it 
is impractical for the case to be referred to an appellate court and secondly, where new evidence has arisen that 
has not been before the courts, demonstrating beyond any doubt either that no offence was committed or that the 
defendant did not commit the crime. The applicant must be technically and morally innocent. See Hansard, HC 
Vol. 483, col. 701 (November 25, 2008) (Maria Eagle, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Justice) 
available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081125/debtext/81125-
0016.htm#08112592000047, last viewed 17 April 2017. See also Ministry of Justice, Review of the Executive 
Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report, 2009 available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/docs/royal-prerogative.pdf, last 
viewed 17 April 2017.
10
 See R.E. Ross, The Court of Criminal Appeal  (1911, Butterworth and Co, London); D. Seaborne Davies, 
“The Court of Criminal Appeal: The First Forty Years” (1951) 1 JSPTL (NS) 425 - 441; M. Knight, op cit, n.6 
above; K. Malleson, Review of the Appeal Process, RCCJ Research Study No 17 (1993, HMSO, London); 
Tucker Committee, Report of the Departmental Committee on New Trials in Criminal Cases Cmnd 9150, (1954, 
HMSO, London); Donovan Committee, Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Court of Criminal 
Appeal Cmnd 2755 (1965, HMSO, London); RCCJ, op cit, n 6 above, ch 10.
11
 See Malleson, op cit, n 6 above; Pattenden, op cit, n 6 above, 74; B. Woffinden, Miscarriages of Justice 
(1987, Hodder and Staughton, London) 322; P. Hill, “Finding Finality” (1996) New Law Journal 1552; A. 
Sanders and R. Young, Criminal Justice (2000, Butterworths, London) 641.
12
 See K. Malleson, “Miscarriages of Justice and the Accessibility of the Court of Appeal” (1991) Crim LR 323 - 
332; RCCJ, op cit, n 6 above, ch.10; J.R. Spencer ‘Does Our Present Criminal Appeal System Make Sense’ 
(2006) Crim LR 677.
4In doing so, the Court has to take account of the role of the jury and the principle of finality and weigh 
that against the merits of quashing the conviction. Whilst the consensus may suggest that the Court's 
approach to finality and deference leads it to be restrictive, the literature does not provide a gauge by 
which this should be measured. This would be very difficult given the complexity of the role of the 
Court of Appeal in criminal cases. The balancing exercises a criminal appeal court has to perform can 
be illustrated by looking at the criteria for a good criminal appellate system as identified by Sir Robin 
Auld in his Review of the Criminal Courts.13 They are that it should do justice to individual defendants 
and to the public as represented principally by the prosecution; it should bring finality to the criminal 
process, subject to the need to safeguard either side from clear and serious injustice and such as 
would damage the integrity of the criminal justice system; it should be readily accessible, consistently 
with a proper balance of the interest of individual defendants and that of the public; it should be clear 
and simple in its structures and procedures; it should be efficient and effective in its use of judges and 
other resources in righting injustice and in declaring and applying the law, and it should be speedy. 
Whilst the Court’s structures and procedures can be assessed for clarity and simplicity, and the speed 
by which it hears appeals can be measured, defining bench marks by which the other criteria can be 
measured is very difficult. Despite this, the evidence to show the Court has been impeded by jury 
deference, the principle of finality and a lack of resources is overwhelming. This article acknowledges 
that these areas have caused problems for the Court but it seeks to argue that it was their influence 
prior to the Court of Criminal Appeal’s creation that has caused the problems because it was due to 
these factors that it was created as a court of review. Therefore, this article argues that the Court’s 
function of review (and not its powers) lies at the heart of the problem.
Review and Rehearing
The Court has undoubtedly been influenced by its deference to the jury verdict, the principle of finality 
and issues of resources but the difficulties and contradictions of the Court can be traced back to the 
debates on the 1907 Criminal Appeal Bill which did not make entirely clear what the role of the Court 
was supposed to be. Arguably, it is this which has led to the Court’s difficulties ever since. 
The creation of the Court was not only innovative in terms of creating a criminal appeal system for 
errors of fact it was also innovative in creating a court of review as a mechanism for determining 
appeals.14 When the Court was created, appeals to the Court of Appeal in civil cases15 and appeals 
13
 R. Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts, 2001, ch 12, para 2. Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/, last viewed 27 May 
2017.
14
 See John Rawlinson, HC Debs, 8 May 1907, col 284.
15
 The Court of Appeal heard only civil cases until 1966 when the Criminal Division was created. The Court of 
Appeal was perceived to have a higher status than the Court of Criminal Appeal which was criticised by 
JUSTICE who stated that they found it difficult to be satisfied with a system whereby a Court of Appeal which 
dealt with civil rights had a higher status than a Court of Criminal Appeal which dealt with the life and liberty of 
the subject (op cit, n.6, para. 46). The change was a recommendation of the Donovan Committee which had 
been set up to consider this issue; the change was recommended to bring some consistency to the decision-
making in criminal appeals (op cit, n. 10, para. 64).
5from magistrates’ courts in criminal cases both involved a rehearing of the facts and the Court of 
Appeal in civil cases had the power to order a retrial thereby sending the case back to the jury for 
determination. The contradiction that emerged from the debates on the 1907 Criminal Appeal Bill was 
how far the Court of Criminal Appeal was supposed to fulfill the function of rehearing as well as 
review.
The Act was introduced into the Commons on behalf of the Government by the Attorney General, Sir 
John Walton. The confusion starts with Sir John stating that what was proposed was to give the Court 
of Criminal Appeal ‘a similar power of review’ to that given to the Court of Appeal in civil cases but he 
went on to say that ‘the appeal in a civil case was a re-hearing and he himself examined and cross-
examined before a Court of Appeal witnesses whom that Court had summoned for the purpose of 
elucidating some obscurity in the case under investigation.’ He went on to say that ‘all that was 
intended here was that the same functions should be discharged by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 
the same method and with almost identical powers.’16 This appears to confuse the role of a review 
court with one of rehearing.
Sir John further confused the two roles when he outlined the procedure by which the Court would 
operate. He stated ‘the court would have before them the evidence on the Judge’s notes, and the 
usual materials, supplemented here and there, it might be, by extracts from shorthand notes, and the 
court might then say that they thought there was no ground whatever for disturbing the conviction and 
dismiss the appeal or they might say we should like to hear one of the witnesses called before us, or it 
might be more than one, so that questions might be put on a definite point which was entirely 
overlooked at the trial.’17 He pointed out that this was a power that the Court of Appeal in civil cases 
possessed and ‘it was all important that that power should be possessed if the Court of Criminal 
Appeal was to be a Court of effective review.’18 Again, Sir John appears to be blurring the distinction 
between a court of review and one of rehearing. 
Later in the debate, he further blurred the distinction between the two as he reiterated that ‘the 
evidence that had already been taken, and the summing up of the learned judge, would constitute the 
materials which the tribunal would be called upon to consider’ but he then went on to say that as well 
as witnesses being called to appear before the Court again, it would be possible for the Court to send 
one of its own members to hear witnesses and to form an opinion upon their reliability with the power 
to communicate his views to his fellow members, or the Court might send a Commissioner who might 
take the evidence of the witnesses on oath and subject them to cross-examination19 which appears to 
be a mixture of review and rehearing. 
16
 HC Debs, 31 May 1907, col 232.
17




 HC Debs, 29 July 1907, col  649.
6Sir John clearly envisaged the Court taking an investigative role as he pointed out during the debates 
that the Court would be able to do all that the Home Secretary could do when deciding on the 
prerogative of mercy and ‘the Court would have ample power to get at the truth.’20 But he also 
emphasised that the appeal would not be a second trial as ‘there should be one trial and one trial 
only’ and ‘there should also be a Court of review with the responsibility of deciding whether that trial 
had been satisfactory and whether the conviction should be quashed or not.’21 He also stated that the 
anticipated exercise of powers to summon witnesses would be infrequent, being unnecessary in 
‘ordinary cases.’ These contradictory views are unsurprising when considering he himself stated that 
‘in the course of the debate the most contradictory views had been expressed with regard to the 
functions of the Court of Criminal Appeal’22 and his conclusion was ‘how the experiment would work 
would largely depend upon the views of the court itself.’23 
The confusion over the terms ‘review’ and ‘rehearing’ has meant that they have not been used 
consistently in law and it is necessary for the purposes of this article to further define what these 
terms mean. Since the Summary Act 1879, appeals from the magistrates’ court have been by way of 
‘rehearing.’24 This means the appeal is heard de novo in the Crown Court and the procedure is the 
same as that for a summary trial. The parties are not limited to, or bound to call all, the evidence 
called before the magistrates' court and additional evidence may be freely admitted on appeal. The 
Crown Court may reverse, affirm or amend the magistrates' decision, or may remit the matter back to 
them giving its opinion for its disposal.25 It may also consider points of law as well as decide matters 
of fact and may impose its own sentence, though not one greater than the magistrates could have 
passed. 
From the Judicature Acts 1873-75 and up until the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, appeals to the Court 
of Appeal in civil cases were also a ‘rehearing.’26 However, this term was deceptive in that the Court 
would not rehear all the evidence and the witnesses, as in appeals from magistrates’ courts, but 
would rather perform a review of all the evidence, including the transcripts of the witnesses. Further 
evidence on questions of fact which had occurred after the date of the trial could be adduced but 
restrictions were imposed on further evidence which related to matters that had occurred before the 
judgment.27 Andrews has stated that ‘the reason for this restriction is obvious. In the interests of 
20








 Section 19 and reaffirmed by Supreme Court Act 1981, section 79(3).
25
 Supreme Court Act 1981, s 48.
26
 R.S.C. Ord. 59, r. 3. See J. Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil Justice (1987, Stevens and Sons, London) 232; 
D. di Mambro, Civil Court Manual (1999, Butterworths, London) 493; J.A. Jolowicz, On Civil Procedure 
(2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 276; J.R. Spencer, Jackson’s Machinery of Justice (1989, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 91. 
27
 R.S.C. Ord. 59 r10 stated that no such further evidence shall be admitted ‘except on special grounds.’ The 
common law has also provided restrictions which are that it must be shown that the evidence could not have 
been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; the evidence must be such that it would probably 
have an important influence on the result of the case and it must be credible offence. See Ladd v Marshall 
7finality, directness and economy, the hearing at first instance should be the only opportunity to delve 
into matters of primary fact.’28 This is reinforced by the distinction the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
draws between the primary facts found by the judge in the lower court and the inferences that can be 
drawn from them. 
The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) rarely rejects a finding by a trial judge of specific or primary facts, 
especially when the finding is based on the credibility or bearing of a witness. However, as a result of 
the civil division’s powers to draw inferences from facts,29 it is willing to form an independent opinion 
of the proper inferences to be drawn from the specific or primary facts found by the trial judge.30 In 
Saunders v Adderley, the Privy Council stated:
‘It is well established that an appellate court should not disturb the findings of fact of the trial 
judge when his findings depend upon his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses which 
he has had the advantage of seeing and hearing – an advantage denied to the appellate 
court. However, when the question is what inferences are to be drawn from specific facts an 
appellate court is in as good a position to evaluate the evidence as the trial judge.’ 31
The burden of showing that a trial judge was wrong in a finding of fact lies on the appellant and if the 
Court of Appeal is not satisfied that he was wrong the appeal will be dismissed.32 Whilst this will be 
more difficult where the finding of fact depends on the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the 
civil division of the Court of Appeal has been empowered to reach its own conclusions based on the 
evidence. In Coghlan v Cumberland,33 Sir Nathaniel Lindley M.R. stated:
‘Even where….the appeal turns on a question of fact, the Court has to bear in mind that its 
duty is to rehear the case, and the Court must reconsider the materials before the judge, with 
such materials as it may have decided to admit. The Court must then make up its own mind, 
not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it, and 
not shrinking from overruling it if on full consideration it comes to the conclusion that it is 
wrong.’
[1954] 1 WLR 1489; Skone v Skone [1971] 1 WLR 812; Sutcliffe v Pressdram Ltd [1991] 1 QB 153. In 
Hertfordshire Investments Ltd v Bubb [2001] 1 WLR 2318 it was stated that the principles from Ladd v 
Marshall should be looked at with considerable care but not as strict rules which gives some flexibility.
28
 N. Andrews, English Civil Procedure (2003, Oxford University Press, Oxford) 908.
29
 R.S.C. Ord 59 r 10.
30
 See Jacob, op cit, n 26 above, 234.
31
 Sir John Balcombe, Saunders v Adderley [1999] 1 WLR 884 at 889, citing Dominion Trust Co v New York 
Insurance Co [1919] AC 254; Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370; Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 
WLR 246. See Andrews, n 28 above, 907. In Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 2600 it was 
held that the parties are entitled to appeal on questions of fact if the previous decision cannot reasonably be 
explained or justified and so is one which no reasonable judge could have reached. 
32
 Norman v King [1946] 1 All ER 339.
33
 [1898] 1 Ch. 704.
8In 1996, the Bowman Committee was set up to carry out a full review of the civil division of the Court 
of Appeal because of an increasing number of applications and appeals which had resulted in long 
delays in the hearing of appeals.34 The recommendations made were ‘to ensure that the Civil Division 
deals with cases of an appropriate weight for a Court consisting of senior and very experienced 
judges’ and ‘to improve the way the Civil Division works so that it can deal with its caseload more 
quickly.’ As a result of these recommendations and Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice report, 
amendments were made to the role and powers of the civil division of the Court.35
Under the Civil Procedure Rules, every civil appeal will now be limited to a ‘review’ of the decision of 
the lower court unless a practice direction makes different provision for a particular category of appeal 
or the Court considers that in the circumstances of an individual appeal it would be in the interests of 
justice to hold a ‘rehearing.’36 The appeal court still has the power to draw any inference of fact it 
considers justified on the evidence37 but unless it orders otherwise, the appeal court will not receive 
oral evidence or evidence which was not before the lower court.38 The appeal court will only allow an 
appeal where the decision of the lower court was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or 
other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.39 In assessing these changes, Brook LJ in 
Tanfern Ltd v Cameron-MacDonald stated ‘under the new practice, the decision of the lower court will 
attract much greater significance. The appeal court’s duty is now limited to a review of that decision, 
and it may only interfere in the quite limited circumstances set out in CPR, r 52.11(3).’40 In Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry v Lewis,41 it was stressed that a rehearing should only be held in 
exceptional circumstances where it was necessary in order for justice to be done. 
Whilst the changes the Civil Procedure Rules have brought are more restrictive than previously in 
terms of limiting the majority of appeals to a review of the trial judge’s decision and only allowing oral 
evidence and new evidence in very limited circumstances, the general powers of the civil division 
remain wide and extensive; it has all the powers of the lower court42 and has the power to affirm, set 
34
 Review of the Court of Appeal (Civil Divison), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/civil/bowman/bowman2.htm, last reviewed 
25 May 2017.
35
 See R. Nobles and D.Schiff, “The Right to Appeal and Workable Systems of Justice” (2002) 65(5) Modern 
Law Review 676 at 684-689. For an analysis of the Woolf reforms see D. Dwyer, The Civil Procedure Rules Ten 
Years On (2009, Oxford University Press, Oxford) and J. Sorabji, English Civil Justice After the Woolf and 
Jackson Reforms (2014, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
36
 CPR, r 52.11(1).
37
 CPR, r 52.11(4).
38
 CPR, r 52.11(2).
39
 CPR, r 52.11(3).
40
 [2000] 1 W.L.R 1311 at 1317. See the House of Lords decision of Barber v Somerset County Council [2004] 
UKHL 13 for a conflicting decision on the role of the appeal court in terms of the circumstances in which it may 
interfere with the ruling of a trial judge. 
41
 The Times, 16 August 2001. It has been argued that the definitions of ‘review’ and ‘rehearing’ are not clear in 
civil appeals and for an analysis of this, see C.Blake, L. Blom-Cooper, and C. Drewery,  The Court of Appeal 
(2007, Hart Publishing, Oxford) pp. 22-30.
42
 CPR, r 52.10(1).
9aside or vary any order or judgment made or given by the lower court43 which includes the power to 
order a new trial or hearing.44 
In contrast to appeals from magistrates’ courts and appeals to the civil division of the Court of Appeal, 
the role and powers of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal are much more limited. The criminal 
division is a court of ‘review’ and s. 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended by s.1 of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1995, states that the Court of Appeal ‘shall allow an appeal if they think the 
conviction is unsafe; and shall dismiss such an appeal in any other case.’ The criminal division has 
the power to hear fresh evidence where this is ‘necessary or expedient in the interests of justice’45 
and has to have regard to four factors which are (a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be 
‘capable of belief’; (b) whether the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal’; (c) 
whether the evidence would have been admissible in the lower court on an issue which is the subject 
of the appeal and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence 
in those proceedings.46 The criminal division also has the power to order a retrial which was initially 
given in fresh evidence cases only47 but is now a general power48 and can be ordered only after the 
Court has quashed the conviction.49 
The review function was described by Lord Tucker in the Privy Council judgment of Aladesuru50 in 
1955, where he compared the civil and criminal systems of appeal:
‘It has long been established that the appeal is not by way of rehearing as in civil appeals 
from a judge sitting alone, but it is a limited appeal that precludes the court from reviewing the 
evidence and making its own evaluation thereof.’
And Lloyd LJ in R v McIlkenny and others51 in 1991:
‘Like the criminal division, the civil division is also a creature of statute. But its powers are 
much wider. A civil appeal is by way of rehearing of the whole case. So the court is 
concerned with fact as well as law. It is true the court does not rehear the witnesses. But it 
reads their evidence. It follows that in a civil case the Court of Appeal may take a different 
view of the facts from the court below. In a criminal case this is not possible. Since justice is 
as much concerned with the conviction of the guilty as the acquittal of the innocent, and the 
task of convicting the guilty belongs constitutionally to the jury, not to us, the role of the 
criminal division of the Court of Appeal is necessarily limited. Hence it is true to say that 
43
 CPR, r 52.10(2)(a).
44
 CPR, r 52.10(2)(c). 
45
 Section 23(1), Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
46Section 23(2), Criminal Appeal Act 1968 as amended by section 4, Criminal Appeal Act 1995.
47
 Section 1(1), Criminal Appeal Act 1964.
48
 Section 43, Criminal Justice Act 1988.
49Section 7(1), Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
50
 Aladesuru v The Queen (1955) 39 Cr. App. R 184 at 185.
51
 (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 at 311.
10
whereas the civil division of the Court of Appeal has appellate jurisdiction in the full sense, 
the criminal division is perhaps more accurately described as a court of review.’
The JUSTICE Committee in 1964 acknowledged that ‘the court was not set up to re-try cases, but to 
ensure that the due forms of trial were properly observed.’52 Leigh has stated that ‘the function of the 
Court is not to substitute itself for the jury but to decide whether the verdict is one which a properly 
instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.’53 Similarly, Blom-Cooper has stated 
that ‘the Court of Appeal cannot substitute itself for the jury and re-try the case. That is not its 
function. It must oversee the fairness of the trial and satisfy itself that there was evidence on which 
the jury could properly convict.’ 54 Nobles and Schiff have argued that the process of review requires 
the Court of Appeal to identify how a conviction might have been constructed by the jury, rather than 
simply administering justice (or identifying miscarriages of justice). 55 If the Court’s legally defined role 
as a court of review is to merely assess the fairness of the trial and whether there was evidence on 
which the jury could convict beyond all reasonable doubt, this makes it very difficult for injustice to be 
rectified as it precludes the Court from delving too deeply into factual issues and the merits of a case. 
The difficulties caused by this can be illustrated by looking at, firstly, the power the Court has to 
overturn a conviction, and secondly, the grounds of appeal which constitute errors of fact, fresh 
evidence and lurking doubt appeals.
The power to overturn a conviction
The statutory test for quashing a conviction was originally set out in section four of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1907 so the Court could allow the appeal ‘If they think that the verdict of the jury should be 
set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence 
or that the judgment of the Court before whom the appellant was convicted should be set aside on the 
ground of a wrong decision of any question of law or that on any ground there was a miscarriage of 
justice.’ There was also a proviso to this section which allowed the Court to dismiss the appeal if they 
considered that no miscarriage of justice had actually occurred.56 This is the test adopted by Jersey 
which is currently under consideration for reform.57 
52
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53
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Although it is generally accepted that one of the main reasons for the creation of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in England and Wales was for it to be a review tribunal for the findings of the jury, from the 
very first year of its existence the Court did not assume the role that the legislature seemed to have 
envisaged for it and adopted a restrictive approach. The first case reported in the Criminal Appeal 
Reports set the tone for subsequent decisions. In R v Williamson,58 Lord Alverstone, the Lord Chief 
Justice, stated ‘It must be understood that we are not here to re-try the case where there was 
evidence proper to be left to the jury upon which they could come to the conclusion at which they 
arrived.’ Similarly in R v Simpson,59 Darling J stated ‘the jury are the judges of fact. The Act was never 
meant to substitute another form of trial for trial by jury. The case was not a strong one. It would have 
been open to the jury to acquit and no one could have called the verdict perverse. But the verdict 
which the jury have given must stand.’ Similarly, in R v Graham,60 Channell J stated ‘unless we are to 
retry cases we can do nothing in a case like this. It is not because the jury might properly have found 
the other way that we can do anything. We are not authorised to retry the case.’ This attitude was not 
just limited to the early years of the Court. In 1921 in the case of R v Cotton,61 Avory J stated that the 
Court ‘sits only to determine whether justice has been done and not for the retrial of criminal cases.’ 
And in 1949 in the case of R v McGrath,62 the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Goddard said that the 
Court was:
‘Frequently asked to reverse verdicts in cases in which a jury has rejected an alibi, but this 
court cannot interfere in those cases in the ordinary way, because to do so would be to usurp 
the function of the jury. Where there is evidence on which a jury can act and there has been a 
proper direction to the jury this court cannot substitute itself for the jury and re-try the case. 
That is not our function.’63
This attitude of the Court was the correct one as it was created to review the jury’s decision and not to 
rehear the case but this attitude was seen as problematic for those seeking to overturn their 
convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeal’s inability to substitute itself for the jury had a major impact 
on its application of the proviso to section 4 which allowed the Court to uphold a conviction where 
there had been an irregularity at the trial but the appellant’s guilt had been established by the 
evidence. The purpose of the proviso was described in an early case as being that it ‘enables the 
court to go behind technical slips and do substantial justice.’64 There were two main problems 
associated with the proviso which were, firstly, the test the appellate court applied was not based on 
degree of error but was whether, despite the fault, ‘a reasonable jury, after being properly directed, 
58
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would, on the evidence properly admissible, without doubt convict,’65 and secondly, the lack of a 
power to order a retrial in the 1907 Act. The Court was finally given the power to order a retrial in the 
1964 Criminal Appeal Act. The problem this caused was that any major error which may have had an 
impact on the jury meant that the Court allowed the appeal so the feeling at the time was that an 
appeal based on a procedural irregularity had a better chance of success than one concerning factual 
innocence. This has remained a criticism of the Court as discussed below.
The JUSTICE Committee produced a report in 196466 which acknowledged the Court’s reluctance to 
usurp the jury had its origins in ‘the history of the Court’ and ‘also reflects the inherent limitations of 
the system of appeal’ as the Court ‘was not set up to re-try cases but to ensure that the due forms of 
trial were properly observed.’67 However, it argued that the statute did not itself require the Court to 
apply its powers in such a limited manner, the consequences of which were ‘absurd and unjust.’68  It 
saw the restrictive approach of the Court as an ‘expression of an attitude of undue reverence for the 
verdict of a jury’69 and argued that ‘the jury as an instrument of justice should not be regarded as 
infallible, especially in cases where there is an issue of identity.’70 The Committee stated that the 
attitude of the Court to its powers was contrary to the intentions of the 1907 Act and it recommended 
that either the present powers should be interpreted in such a way as to include a wider range of 
circumstances where the court is prepared to intervene or that a specific ground should be 
introduced, namely that ‘it would not be safe to allow the verdict of the jury to stand having regard to 
all the evidence.’71 The report stated that there was nothing in section 4 that required the court to 
apply so stringent a principle on the exercise of its powers and that ‘it seems absurd and unjust that 
verdicts which experienced judges would have thought surprising and not supported by really 
adequate evidence should be allowed to stand for no other reason than they were arrived at by a 
jury.’72
The JUSTICE Committee was far more stringent in its criticisms of the Court’s failure to overturn jury 
verdicts than the Donovan Committee who believed that the problem lay more with the wording of 
section 4(1) than the Court’s interpretation. The Donovan Committee was set up to review the Court’s 
powers and the report stated:
‘Purely as a matter of construction of the language of section 4(1) we cannot say that the 
interpretation adopted by the Court is open to serious doubt. If there was credible evidence 
both ways, and the jury accepted the evidence pointing towards guilt, it is difficult to say that 
the verdict was ‘unreasonable’ or could not ‘be supported having regard to the evidence’ or 
65
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that ‘there was a miscarriage of justice.’ If there be some defect in the situation which requires 
to be remedied, the defect lies in the statutory language rather than in its judicial 
interpretation.’73
The Committee was particularly concerned with disputed identity cases and felt that if the terms of 
section 4(1) were strictly construed, an innocent person who had been wrongly identified, and 
therefore wrongfully convicted, had virtually no protection conferred by a right to appeal provided that 
the evidence of identification was, on the face of it, credible.74 The Committee felt this defect should 
be remedied and proposed that the Court should be given an express power to allow an appeal where 
‘upon consideration of the whole of the evidence, it comes to the conclusion that the verdict is unsafe 
or unsatisfactory.’75 The Committee felt that in spite of the rejection of the words ‘unsafe and 
unsatisfactory’ during the debates on the 1907 Criminal Appeal Bill the Court had sometimes acted as 
though this was the proper test to apply to a jury’s verdict and had quashed a verdict which it 
considered to be unsafe and unsatisfactory in spite of there being some evidence to support it.76 The 
Committee felt that although one of the consequences of this recommendation being accepted was 
that some guilty appellants may escape on appeal, they thought that ‘reliance can safely be placed 
upon the experience and acumen of Her Majesty’s judges to reduce this risk to a minimum.’ The 
advantages to be gained were that the safeguards for an innocent person, wrongfully identified and 
wrongfully convicted, would be increased which ‘the country would probably be prepared to pay a 
small price for reform.’77
The Donovan Committee also proposed an amendment to the proviso to section 4(1) which allowed 
the Court to dismiss the appeal if ‘no substantial miscarriage has actually occurred.’ The Committee 
felt that the word ‘substantial’ should be deleted as ‘it seems to us devoid of practical significance.’78 
The Committee felt that in exercising the proviso, the Court had been coming to a conclusion of fact 
and therefore it would not be a complete innovation if the Court was also charged with the duty of 
deciding whether a verdict of guilty was ‘unsafe or unsatisfactory.’79 Nobles and Schiff have argued 
that the Committee’s acknowledgement that the Court had been coming to conclusions of fact 
suggests that the language of the statute permitted the Court to explore facts as much or as little as 
they wished.80 Therefore, the JUSTICE Committee approach that what restrains the Court is not the 
language of its powers but the approach that it takes to its task appears to be the correct one rather 
than the Donovan Committee approach that it is the wording of the statute that is the problem. 
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The Government adopted the Donovan Committee recommendations and in introducing the Criminal 
Appeal Bill into the Lords in 1966 for the second reading, the Lord Chancellor stated:
‘There has been a general feeling in the legal profession that if you go to the Court of Criminal 
Appeal for an obviously guilty client who has some technical point, if the technical point is 
good, then the guilty man gets off; but that if your only complaint is that your client is entirely 
innocent and had nothing at all to do with the crime, then it is much more difficult. The 
recommendation of the Donovan Committee provides an additional ground on which the 
appeal may be allowed; namely, that the Court is of the opinion that, on the whole, the verdict 
is too unsafe or unsatisfactory to be allowed to stand.’ 81
The three amendments in the Bill to section 4(1) of the 1907 Act were (a) the words ‘under all the 
circumstances of the case it is unsafe or unsatisfactory’ are substituted for the words ‘it is 
unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence’; (b) the words ‘there was a 
material irregularity in the course of the trial’ are substituted for the words ‘on any ground there was a 
miscarriage of justice’; and (c) in the proviso the word ‘substantial’ in relation to ‘miscarriage of justice’ 
was omitted. 
During the debates, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Parker, disputed the contention of the Lord 
Chancellor that providing the ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ ground was an addition to the Court’s 
powers as he had stated that on many occasions he had used the words ‘in all the circumstances of 
the case, the Court has come to the conclusion that it is unsafe for the verdict to stand.’ He went on to 
say that:
‘This is something which we have done and which we continue to do, although it may be we 
have no lawful authority to do it. To say that we have not done it, and we ought to have power 
to do it, is quite wrong. It is done every day and this is giving legislative sanction to our 
action.’82
There was support for this contention from other Lords. Lord Morris, for example, stated:
‘It may well be that the wording is now improved as compared to the wording that previously 
existed, but I respectfully agree with the Lord Chief Justice that this is not a change in the 
approach of the Court.’ 83
And also Lord Pearson:
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‘It is true to say that the existing Court of Criminal Appeal would sometimes tend to act on that 
principle, but if they did it would not be easy to bring their action within the words of the 
existing section 4.’ 84
Therefore, it appeared that the change in the law was supposed to encapsulate a seemingly more 
liberal approach which was already being adopted which begs the question of why the law needed to 
be changed at all. If some judges were using this approach and others were not, this partly explains 
why the Court is criticised for its inconsistent decision-making.
The new power of the Court to review convictions was in section 2 of the 1968 Criminal Appeal Act 
and, as stated by JUSTICE,85 it would appear that Parliament intended in 1968 to impose on the 
Court a duty to form its own opinion about the correctness of a conviction, notwithstanding the fact 
that no criticism could be made of the conduct of the trial. The Court appeared to do this shortly after 
the enactment of the 1968 Act in the case of R v Cooper86 which interpreted the new ‘unsafe and 
unsatisfactory’ ground. The judgment of the Court was given by Lord Widgery who stated:
‘……it is , therefore, a case in which every issue was before the jury and in which the jury was 
properly instructed, and, accordingly, a case in which this Court will be very reluctant indeed 
to intervene. It has been said over and over again throughout the years that this Court must 
recognise the advantage which a jury has in seeing and hearing the witnesses, and if all the 
material was before the jury and the summing-up was impeccable, this Court should not 
lightly interfere. Indeed, until the passing of the Criminal Appeal Act 1966 it was almost 
unheard of for this Court to interfere in such a case.
However, now our powers are somewhat different, and we are indeed charged to allow an 
appeal against conviction if we think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the 
ground that under all the circumstances of the case it is unsafe and unsatisfactory. That 
means that in cases of this kind the Court must ask itself a subjective question, whether we 
are content to let the matter stand as it is, or whether there is not some lurking doubt in our 
minds which makes us wonder whether an injustice has been done. This is a reaction which 
may not be based strictly on the evidence as such; it is a reaction which can be produced by 
the general feel of the case as the Court experiences it.’ 87
84
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The effect of this judgment was the test the Court applied was no longer an objective one because the 
Court now had to apply the subjective test of did the judges themselves feel a doubt about guilt, and if 
they did, the jury’s verdict should be set aside. This was seemingly a more liberal approach which 
would result in more convictions being overturned where there was no fresh evidence or procedural 
error. This approach did not appear to have universal support and the Court’s decision-making 
continued to be criticised. In the course of a debate in the House of Lords in 1986, Lord Silkin made 
various pronouncements on the effect of the unsafe and unsatisfactory ground. Lord Silkin was a 
former Attorney General and had taken part in the debates on the 1966 Act. He stated:
‘I have no doubt that those of us who took part in the legislation in 1968 were of the view that 
this new wording would give to the Court of Appeal, and would be seen to be giving to the 
Court of Appeal, a very wide power indeed to look at the evidence upon which a jury had 
convicted and to ask itself whether that evidence was safe and satisfactory or unsafe and 
unsatisfactory. I have taken the view in various cases that the Court of Appeal has taken a 
narrower view of those words than I would wish it to take.’88
However, he went on to say:
‘I am not criticising the Court of Appeal’s view of the law. I am criticising, if anything, what 
Parliament did in producing a formula which has led to a somewhat restricted form of words. If 
the Court of Appeal’s view is correct, then it seems to be there is a very wide gap between the 
powers of the Home Secretary, as he sees them, and the powers of the Court of Appeal, as it 
regards those powers.’ 89
During the same debate, Lord Pagett was more scathing about the Court’s approach to its powers. He 
stated:
‘Under a series of Lord Chief Justices, the original function of the Court of Criminal Appeal, 
which was to correct miscarriages were forgotten. The Court confined itself to points of law. 
Unfortunately, guilt and innocence is not a point of law.’ 90
Nobles and Schiff have argued that the combined effects of the 1964 and 1966 Acts (which were 
consolidated into the Criminal Appeal Act 1968) appears not to have had any profound impact on the 
Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. They state that perhaps this merely confirmed the view of the Lord 
Chief Justice in 1966 that in introducing the ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ ground the legislature would 
be merely authorizing an already existing practice. Their conclusion was that in the realm of 
convictions which are deemed ‘unsafe’ on the sole basis of the jury verdict being wrong, there is little 
evidence to suggest that reforms achieved through redrafting the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction and 
88
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powers have marked a substantive change in its practice post 1966.91 This was also the conclusion of 
the JUSTICE Committee in 1989, who stated that in their experience:
‘the common attitude of the Court of Appeal is that where all the discrepancies and 
weaknesses of the prosecution evidence have been canvassed before the jury, and the judge 
has summed up fairly and correctly, then it must not interfere with the jury’s verdict, as this 
would amount to a retrial of the merits of the case, which is not its function.’92 
They went on to say:
‘We have come to the conclusion that the present legislation does not sufficiently spell out the 
duty of the Court when deciding an appeal on the basis that the conviction is a miscarriage of 
justice.’93
They recommended that section 2 should be redrafted which would enable the Court to quash a 
conviction where it had doubts about its correctness. The Court’s decision to quash the convictions of 
the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four finally led to the reforms in the 1995 Criminal Appeal Act. 
Both groups of prisoners had previously appealed unsuccessfully to the Court and the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) was announced on the day on the Birmingham Six were 
freed. 
Although the Royal Commission was set up as a direct response to the perceived crisis in the appeal 
process, the terms of reference did not just relate to the appeal and post appeal process but included 
the whole criminal justice system. Initially the terms of reference with regard to the appeal process 
were very narrow and were just ‘the role of the Court of Appeal in considering new evidence on 
appeal, including directing the investigation of allegations.’ However, the Commission extended this 
view to consider all of the Court’s powers and practices, stating that it had not confined itself to the 
issues set out in the terms of reference since they could not be readily separated from the role of the 
Court of Appeal in hearing appeals against conviction in general.94 The Commission’s conclusions 
overall were:
‘In its approach to the consideration of appeals against conviction, the Court of Appeal seems 
to us to have been too heavily influenced by the role of the jury in Crown Court trials. Ever 
since 1907 commentators have detected a reluctance on the part of the Court of Appeal to 
consider whether a jury has reached a wrong decision….We are all of the opinion that the 
91
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Court of Appeal should be readier to overturn jury verdicts than it has shown itself to be in the 
past.’95
The main findings of the Commission in relation to the Court of Appeal’s powers were that much of 
the difficulty in deciding which ground the Court of Appeal was applying under section 2(1) seemed to 
be due to the confusing way the section was drafted and the Court seldom seemed to distinguish 
between ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory.’ The Commission doubted whether there was any real difference 
between the two. They stated that either of the grounds set out in paragraphs (b) and (c) – the error of 
law or a material irregularity during the course of the trial, may cause the Court to think that original 
conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory. Thus there was an overlap between the three grounds of 
appeal.96
The Commission also stated that there was also potential confusion as to the scope of the proviso. 
They stated that its use may be appropriate where there was a material irregularity during the course 
of the trial but the wording seemed difficult to reconcile with the unsafe and unsatisfactory ground or 
the wrong decision on a question of law ground. They stated that it seemed from the decided cases 
that the court did consider whether the unsatisfactory nature of a conviction under either of those two 
grounds is nevertheless outweighed by the consideration that no miscarriage of justice appears to 
have occurred.97
The majority of the Commission recommended that the grounds should be redrafted to a single 
ground of appeal. This single ground was whether a conviction ‘is or maybe unsafe.’ If the court is 
satisfied that the conviction is unsafe it should allow the appeal but if the court felt it may be unsafe 
then it should quash the conviction but order a retrial unless a retrial was not possible. The majority 
saw no need for the proviso because if the court was not convinced the conviction ‘is or may be 
unsafe’ it simply dismisses the appeal.98
Although the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the 1995 Criminal Appeal Act were 
uncannily similar to those which gave rise to the creation of the Court in the first place, there was one 
major difference which was that the judges supported the enactment of the 1995 Act. As Nobles and 
Schiff have noted, the task that faced those who drafted and debated the latest Criminal Appeal Bill 
was similar to that which must have faced those undertaking the same tasks in the 1960s; they were 
concerned to encourage the Court to take a more liberal approach to appeals by the use of statutory 
language, against a background of existing statutory language that already empowered it to take such 
an approach.99 
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The Bill was introduced into the Commons by the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard who stated 
that part one clarified and strengthened the powers of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales, and 
Northern Ireland; part two established the new criminal cases review commission; and part three 
extended the powers of magistrates courts to reopen cases to rectify mistakes.  On the subject of the 
amendments to the grounds of appeal, he stated:
‘The present formula involves three overlapping grounds and is widely felt to cause confusion. 
Under the Bill, the Court of Appeal will allow any appeal where it considers the conviction 
unsafe and will dismiss it in any other case. That simple test clarifies the terms of the existing 
law. In substance, it restates the existing practice of the Court of Appeal and I am pleased to 
note that the Lord Chief Justice has already welcomed it.’100
This declaration that the Bill was simply restating the existing practice of the Court was not new as 
this was exactly what the Lord Chief Justice had declared during the debates on the 1966 Criminal 
Appeal Bill. In the early 1990s it was thought that under the stewardship of Lord Chief Justice Taylor, 
the Court was already acting in accordance with the Cooper standard, and being more willing to order 
retrials so the problem facing Parliament was to devise a form of words which ensured that the Court 
would continue to do what it was (apparently) already doing. This again, begged the question that if 
the law was already producing a more liberal approach why did it need to be changed at all.
Although the provisions in the 1995 Bill were the result of recommendations by the RCCJ, the 
Government had not adopted the full test for quashing convictions as set out in the RCCJ report. The 
Government had rejected the words ‘is or maybe unsafe,’ preferring the test to be simply ‘is unsafe.’ 
Baroness Blatch, Minister for the Home Office had stated:
‘We have made it clear throughout the passage of the Bill that our intention is to consolidate 
the existing practice of the Court of Appeal. The ‘lurking doubt’ test will be maintained, as will 
the possibility for appeals to be allowed on the grounds of errors of law or material 
irregularities at trial. In each case, the issue for the court to decide is whether the conviction is 
unsafe….I believe there are considerable advantages in providing a broad ground for allowing 
an appeal. It allows the court flexibility to allow an appeal on any ground which it considers 
renders the conviction unsafe. There are numerous factors which can render a conviction 
unsafe. There is no need to spell them out in statute because whatever words are used, in the 
end there is only one question for the court to answer: whether or not the conviction is 
unsafe.’ 101
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The new statutory test for quashing convictions was set out in section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 
1968 as amended by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 which stated that the Court of Appeal (a) shall 
allow an appeal against conviction if they think that the conviction is unsafe; and (b) shall dismiss 
such an appeal in any other case. The proviso was now repealed as it was not considered necessary 
under the amended test. 
Despite these changes in the law, the problems associated with the Court have continued. The former 
head of the Criminal Cases Review Commission, Professor Graham Zellick, has stated that appeal 
judges are failing to correct miscarriages of justice where they suspect the jury has come to a wrong 
verdict.102 He has argued that the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) ought to be more active in 
quashing convictions even though there has not been any irregularity in the trial process and that ‘the 
Court of Appeal is even more reluctant in 2008 than in the 1990s to quash convictions because they 
think they are unsafe’ as ‘we are more deferential to a jury now than in the 1990s when things were 
going wrong.’ Zellick further stated that ‘we know from bitter experience that juries get things wrong’ 
and that when he had raised this argument with members of the judiciary he had been admonished 
for asking judges to second-guess the jury. He stated ‘they tell me that in this country we have trial by 
jury, so who are they to go behind the verdict of the jury which has seen all the evidence?’
This was also the conclusion of the House of Commons Justice Committee whose report on the 
workings of the Criminal Cases Review Commission was published in March 2015.  The report stated:
‘While it is important that the jury system is not undermined, properly-directed juries which 
have seen all of the evidence may occasionally make incorrect decisions. The Court's 
jurisprudence in this area, including on 'lurking doubt', is difficult to interpret and it is 
concerning that there is no clear or formal mechanism to consider quashing convictions 
arising from decisions which have a strong appearance of being incorrect. Any change in this 
area would require a change to the Court of Appeal's approach, which would itself require a 
statutory amendment to the Court's grounds for allowing appeals. We are aware that this 
would constitute a significant change to the system of criminal appeals in this country and that 
it would qualify to a limited extent the longstanding constitutional doctrine of the primacy of 
the jury. Neither of these things should be allowed to stand in the way of ensuring that 
innocent people are not falsely imprisoned.’103
And: 
‘We recommend that the Law Commission review the Court of Appeal's grounds for allowing 
appeals. This review should include consideration of the benefits and dangers of a statutory 
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change to allow and encourage the Court of Appeal to quash a conviction where it has a 
serious doubt about the verdict, even without fresh evidence or fresh legal argument.’104 
As discussed above, this is now being considered by the Law Commission (though not from a 
Government recommendation) however, a further analysis of factual error appeals reveals that a 
change in the Court’s powers is unlikely to result in a change in the Court’s approach.
Factual error appeals
Factual error appeals have proven to be the most problematic for the Court because they require the 
Court to trespass on the role of the jury somewhat. The Court is very reluctant to do this and as a 
result of that, the Court has the reputation that an appeal based on a procedural irregularity is much 
more likely to be successful.105 The two factual error grounds are ‘lurking doubt’ and fresh evidence 
and the appellant is essentially arguing that he/she did not commit the crime. The lurking doubt 
ground was established in the case of R v Cooper,106 as discussed above. This ground tends to be 
argued where there is no fresh evidence and no irregularity but the appellant is asking the Court to 
reassess the evidence.107
The reluctance of the judges to usurp the role of the jury clearly inhibited their use of the ‘lurking 
doubt’ ground of appeal. In their 1989 report on miscarriages of justice, JUSTICE stated that in their 
experience of assisting with appeals against conviction, the lurking doubt power had made very little 
difference to the way in which the Court decided appeals.  In giving evidence to the Committee, the 
Registrar of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, Master Thompson, said that the ‘lurking 
doubt’ principle was not implicit in the term ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ and that the Court had to have 
regard to the language of the statute, which did not speak of a ‘lurking doubt.’ He said that some of 
the senior judges did not regard Lord Widgery’s interpretation as authoritative.108  This would explain 
why the number of lurking doubt appeals is so low; Malleson’s study109 of the first 300 appeals of 
1990 revealed that the principle of lurking doubt was directly or indirectly raised in ten of the 281 
appeals which were finally decided. This suggests that ‘lurking doubt’ cases constitute a relatively 
small proportion of appeals. Her conclusions were that the Court appears to regard the principle as a 
last resort for those cases where no criticism can be made of the trial, yet concern about the justice of 
the conviction still lingers. 
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Malleson’s research was carried out for the RCCJ which discussed the ‘lurking doubt’ ground and 
stated that they ‘fully appreciate the reluctance felt by judges sitting in the Court of Appeal about 
quashing a jury’s verdict’ as ‘the jury has seen all the witnesses and heard their evidence; the Court of 
Appeal has not.’110 In their response to the RCCJ, the Government stated that the concept of lurking 
doubt was incorporated into the then new ‘safety’ test.111 This was confirmed by an update of 
Malleson’s research using the first 300 appeals of 2002 which revealed that the principle of lurking 
doubt was referred to directly or indirectly in seven of the 300 appeals with one allowed and six 
dismissed or refused.112 Therefore, although lurking doubt has arguably been incorporated into 
‘unsafe,’ the position under the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 is not markedly different to that under the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1966 with the Court continuing to adopt a restrictive approach to these appeals 
despite the recommendations of the RCCJ. 
The Court’s approach is certainly hampered by its deference to the jury but its review function 
ensures that the Court continues to take a restrictive approach. The Court reviews whether the jury 
could have convicted and in the absence of any errors which may have affected their decisions and 
any new evidence which may cast doubt on the verdict, the Court is reluctant to interfere. This ground 
was deliberately created so the Court would take a more interventionist approach to determining the 
appeal and specifically where it considered there to be injustice. In this sense it set itself up to fail as 
the Court’s decision-making process is not conducive to determining these appeals. This was 
highlighted by the late Court of Appeal judge, Sir Frederick Lawton:  
‘The court does not re-try cases…It has to proceed on the basis that findings of fact implicit in 
the jury’s verdict are the facts of the case. It can only disregard them if there is new evidence, 
or the findings of the jury were perverse, or the court has a lurking doubt. Reading a transcript 
of evidence is not conducive to raising a lurking doubt.’113
The Court was originally given wide powers under section nine of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 to 
adduce fresh evidence on appeal but it imposed its own restrictions from civil appeals which were that 
the evidence had to be credible and relevant to the issue of guilt,114 the evidence had to be 
admissible,115 and the evidence could not have been put before the jury.116 Although it may have been 
the intention of Parliament when enacting section nine that the Court of Criminal Appeal would take 
an active role in hearing new evidence and reassessing the old evidence in the case, the Court used 
its review function to adopt a restrictive approach. This is illustrated by Lord Parker CJ in R v Parks:117
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‘It is only rarely that this court allows further evidence to be called, and it is quite clear that the 
principles upon which this court acts must be kept within narrow confines, otherwise in every 
case this court would in effect be asked to effect a new trial.’
In 1966, the Donovan Committee discussed the issue of fresh evidence and agreed with the various 
pronouncements in the judgments that the Court of Criminal Appeal was not a court of retrial and an 
appeal to it ‘is not an appeal by way of a rehearing of the case.’  The Committee acknowledged that if 
fresh evidence was admitted as a matter of course there would clearly be a risk that the Court would 
on occasions find itself retrying a case which was ‘a function which Parliament did not intend it to 
discharge’118 But the Committee heard evidence that the conditions the Court had imposed on the 
reception of fresh evidence were too narrow and it recommended that additional evidence should be 
received if it was relevant and credible and there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to place 
it before the jury.119 These recommendations were the subject of a late amendment to the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1966 which then became section twenty three of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. 
However, despite these changes to the Court’s powers, the restrictive approach to fresh evidence 
appeals continued. In her research for the RCCJ on the first 300 appeals of 1990, Malleson found that 
in fourteen of the twenty-three cases in which fresh evidence was admitted by the Court (sixty-one per 
cent), four were allowed and two were adjourned for a full hearing (being renewed applications). In 
two cases retrials were ordered. Therefore, Malleson states that ‘the number of appeals which 
succeeded on the basis of fresh evidence was small, being less than seventeen per cent of the total 
fresh evidence cases and just over one per cent of all the cases reviewed.’120 These figures are based 
on the number of appeals allowed without a retrial. 
The RCCJ made various recommendations which were incorporated into section twenty three of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 by section four of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 with the aim of widening the 
scope of the receipt of fresh evidence by the criminal division of the Court of Appeal. The test in 
section 23(2)(a) was changed from ‘likely to be credible’ to ‘capable of belief’ as this would ‘be a 
slightly wider formula giving the court greater scope for doing justice.’121 There were two amendments 
which would arguably have resulted in the Court taking an even more restrictive approach to fresh 
evidence appeals; the duty to admit evidence under section twenty three if the requirements of 
section 23(2) are fulfilled was abolished and replaced with a discretion, and the Court’s rarely used 
power to rehear the evidence presented at the trial was abolished.122 As Pattenden has stated ‘this 
can only increase the difficulty for the criminal division of the Court of Appeal of deciding whether a 
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conviction is unsafe because of jury error’.123  Removal of the Court’s power to rehear trial evidence 
reinforces the review function which arguably is what has caused the problems in the first place. 
An update of Malleson’s research on the first 300 appeals of 2016 shows that the Court’s attitude to 
fresh evidence appeals since the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 is very similar, despite the changes in the 
law.124  Fresh evidence was admitted by the Court in eight of the forty-two cases arguing fresh 
evidence grounds (nineteen per cent) which is significantly lower than sixty-one per cent admitted in 
1990. Of the eight appeals where the fresh evidence was admitted, one was allowed and seven were 
dismissed. In two cases, a retrial was ordered. Therefore, the number of appeals which succeeded on 
the basis of fresh evidence in 2016 was very small being two per cent of the total fresh evidence 
cases and 0.3 per cent of all 300 cases reviewed. These figures are based on the one appeal 
allowed. The two per cent figure in 2016 is obviously much lower than seventeen per cent in 1990 
which is possibly evidence of the Court’s restrictive approach as fresh evidence was admitted in a 
higher number of appeals in 1990. The larger number of appeals based on fresh evidence in 2016 
may be evidence that more fresh evidence is now being brought to the Court which is beneficial but 
the success rate of one per cent of all cases reviewed in 1990 and 0.3 per cent in 2016 shows that 
fresh evidence appeals remain very rare and the chances of success are rarer still. 
Fresh evidence appeals illustrate how complicated the relationship between the Court of Appeal and 
the jury is. There are two main reasons for the criminal division’s deference to the jury verdict. The 
first is because an appeal is not a rehearing of witnesses, the jury who has seen the witnesses is 
supposed to be in a better position to draw inferences than the Court of Appeal, as in civil appeals 
discussed above. The second is the constitutional reason that the task of deciding whether a 
defendant is factually guilty or not is given to the jury and not the Court of Appeal. Both of these 
reasons become problematic when applied to fresh evidence appeals and the main difficulty the 
review function causes is how does the criminal division of the Court of Appeal assess fresh evidence 
and in doing so, does it decide on guilt and innocence?
In Stafford v DPP,125 the House of Lords held that it was the task of the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) when deciding the impact of fresh evidence to consider the weight of the evidence itself and 
not concern itself so much with the question as to what effect it might have had on a jury.126 This 
approach has been the subject of much criticism,127 most notably from the former Law Lord, Lord 
Devlin, who argued that the House of Lords had undermined the constitutional right to trial by jury, by 
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sanctioning the appeal court’s subjective appraisal of guilt. He argued that the accused now had a 
mixed trial by judges and jury.128 There was support for this view from the RCCJ:
‘In our view, the criticism made by Lord Devlin and others has force insofar as it concerns a 
decision by the court to hear and evaluate itself the fresh evidence and despite it to reject the 
appeal. In our view, once the court has decided to receive evidence that is relevant and 
capable of belief, and which could have affected the outcome of the case, it should quash the 
conviction and order a retrial unless that is not practicable or desirable. The Court of Appeal, 
which has not seen the other witnesses in the case nor heard their evidence, is not in our 
view the appropriate tribunal to assess the ultimate credibility and effect on a jury of the fresh 
evidence. It should not normally decide the question of the weight of the evidence itself unless 
it is satisfied that the fresh evidence causes the verdict to be unsafe, in which case it should 
quash the conviction.’129
The RCCJ also stated that where a retrial was impracticable or otherwise undesirable, the Court of 
Appeal should follow the Stafford test and decide the matter for itself rather than just simply allowing 
the appeal.130 The House of Lords was given the opportunity of amending Stafford in R v 
Pendleton.131 The Crown relied on the decision in Stafford v DPP while the appellants relied on the 
judgment of R v McNamee132 where Swinton Thomas LJ had applied the jury impact test:
‘We have…..concluded that the conviction is unsafe because we cannot be sure that the jury 
would have reached the same conclusion that they were sure of guilt if they had the fresh 
evidence we have heard. Furthermore the case as presented to us by both sides is very 
different to that presented at trial.’
The leading speech in R v Pendleton was given by Lord Bingham who discussed the difficulties of the 
Court’s task in relation to fresh evidence appeals as:
….it will ordinarily be safe for the Court of Appeal to infer that the factual ingredients 
essential to prove guilt have been established against the satisfaction of the jury. But the 
Court of Appeal can rarely ever know, save perhaps from questions asked by the jury after 
retirement, at what points the jury have felt difficulty. The jury’s process of reasoning will not 
be revealed and, if a number of witnesses give evidence bearing on a single question, the 
Court of Appeal will never know which of those witnesses the jury accepted and which, if any, 
they doubted or rejected.133 
128
 P. Devlin, The Judge (1979, Oxford University Press, Oxford) 158.
129
 RCCJ, op cit, n 6 above, ch 10, para 62.
130
 ibid, para 63.
131
 [2002] 1 WLR 72.
132
 [1998] EWCA Crim 3524.
133
 Op cit, n. 131, 82.
26
Lord Bingham accepted the appellant’s submission that the starting point had to be recognition of the 
jury as the tribunal of fact but he was not persuaded that the House of Lords had laid down any 
incorrect principle in Stafford, ‘so long as the Court of Appeal bears very clearly in mind that the 
question for its consideration is whether the conviction is safe and not whether the accused is 
guilty.’134 Therefore:
‘The Court of Appeal can make its assessment of the fresh evidence it has heard, but save in 
a clear case it is at a disadvantage in seeking to relate that evidence to the rest of the 
evidence which the jury heard. For these reasons it will usually be wise for the Court of 
Appeal, in a case of any difficulty, to test their own provisional view by asking whether the 
evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to 
convict. If it might, the conviction must be thought to be unsafe.’135
Donald Pendleton’s appeal was allowed on the basis that the Court of Appeal had failed to appreciate 
that the importance of the fresh evidence was that it would have led to the trial being conducted 
completely differently:
‘Had the jury been trying a different case on substantially different evidence the outcome 
must be in doubt. In holding otherwise the Court of Appeal strayed beyond its true function of 
review and made findings that were not open to it in all the circumstances. Indeed it came 
perilously close to considering whether the appellant, in its judgment, was guilty.’136
Lords Steyn and Hope agreed with Lord Bingham’s reasoning but Lord Hobhouse took a differing 
view, though agreeing that the conviction should be quashed. He felt that changing the test to ‘unsafe’ 
had reinforced the reasoning in Stafford v DPP that ‘appeals are not to be allowed unless the Court of 
Appeal has itself made the requisite assessment’137 as:
‘In my judgment it is not right to attempt to look into the minds of the members of the jury. 
Their deliberations are secret and their precise and detailed reasoning is not known. For an 
appellate court to speculate, whether hypothetically or actually, is not appropriate. It is for the 
Court of Appeal to answer the direct and simply stated question: Do we think that the 
conviction was unsafe?’138
The question after R v Pendleton was what approach the Court of Appeal would follow in fresh 
evidence appeals; would it be Lord Bingham’s slightly more liberal approach in highlighting the jury 












unsurprisingly, unclear as both tests tend to be used which adds to the Court’s inconsistent decision-
making.139
The Court of Appeal’s deference to the jury verdict is difficult to comprehend either in fresh evidence 
appeals, because the Court is deciding on evidence never before the jury, nor lurking doubt appeals, 
because the Court is being asked to look for a doubt which the jury never noticed. If the criminal 
division of the Court of Appeal was given the power to rehear the case, as in appeals from 
magistrates’ courts, the first main reason for the Court’s deference would be eliminated because the 
Court would no longer be able to argue that the jury was in a better position to draw inferences than 
the Court because the jury had seen the witnesses and the Court had not. 
Although the second main reason for the Court of Appeal’s deference is that constitutionally the task 
of deciding whether a defendant is factually guilty or not is given to the jury and not the Court, the 
court does appear to decide on issues of guilt and innocence. There are various judgments where the 
Court has expressed a view that it felt that there had been a miscarriage of justice in that an innocent 
person had been wrongly convicted, or at the very least that an injustice had occurred,140 and 
judgments such as R v Hanratty141show that the Court can and does decide on the basis of guilt. This 
is to some extent inevitable in fresh evidence and lurking doubt appeals as both require the Court to 
form a subjective opinion about the evidence in the case.
If we accept that the Court is making decisions based on guilt and innocence, although not allowed 
within its legally defined role, the wider theoretical question is whether the Court of Appeal should be 
deciding on guilt and innocence more overtly by rehearing the case. This would clearly remove the 
constitutional reason for the Court’s deference to the jury verdict but in Lord Devlin’s view, would 
undermine the right to trial by jury. Pattenden has argued that Lord Devlin’s criticism is based on the 
assumption that the right to trial by jury persists after a trial has already taken place, as the counter 
view is that a defendant’s right to trial by jury is fully satisfied by the original trial.142 It appears that 
most of Lord Devlin’s criticism, and the RCCJ’s support of it, was based on the fact that the effect of 
the Stafford approach was that the case was part heard by the jury and part heard by the Court of 
Appeal and involved the Court forming its own views on the credibility and reliability of witnesses and 
also making assumptions about the original jury’s decision-making. This led to what Lord Devlin called 
‘an imperfect retrial by judges.’ 
Whilst Lord Devlin, and others, may argue that jury decision-making is preferable to judicial decision-
making, and that cases which involve fresh evidence should be sent back to the jury for retrial, this 
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does not solve the problem of the decision-making process that the criminal division has to adopt 
when deciding whether to quash the conviction and send the case back for retrial as a retrial cannot 
be ordered until the conviction has been quashed. If the Court of Appeal is currently using ‘an 
imperfect retrial by judges’ to uphold the conviction then arguably it would be preferable for the 
appellant if the Court were to hear the entire case on appeal, unfettered by the restraints that the 
Court’s review function currently places on it. This would mean that the Court would no longer have to 
choose between the jury impact test and the Stafford approach and the problems they cause in 
assessing new evidence on appeal against the evidence given at trial, and the Court would no longer 
have to speculate about jury decision-making and make decisions which are not transparent and can 
never be tested on what the jury did or did not decide with regard to the evidence. If the Court is 
already deciding on factual issues to quash convictions, which is effectively an acquittal in the Crown 
Court, or substituting alternative offences on the basis of implied guilt and innocence then it does not 
seem such a leap to also give the Court the power to rehear the case.
However, a rehearing de novo is not going to be possible in every case just as a retrial by jury is not 
possible in every case. If a case is particularly old, as many in the Court of Appeal are because of the 
length of time it takes to appeal, and the fact that most of the references from the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission have already been through the appeal process, it may not be practically possible 
to retry the case on appeal. This potentially means that the number of fresh evidence appeals where 
a rehearing de novo would be possible would be relatively small and therefore the current 
unsatisfactory process would have to be used for those appeals where a rehearing de novo is not 
possible. 
Therefore, instead of giving the criminal division the power to rehear the appeal de novo, an 
alternative solution would be to give the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, the powers that the 
civil division currently has. This form of rehearing would allow the criminal division to read all the 
evidence in the case, including the transcripts of the witnesses, and it would allow the judges to draw 
their own inferences from the facts and reach their own conclusions on the evidence. Whilst the 
powers of the civil division are currently more restrictive than before, they are still much wider and 
extensive than the powers of the criminal division as discussed above. This is particularly anomalous 
when considering an appellant’s liberty may be at stake and there are innocent people serving prison 
sentences because the criminal division is not providing an effective mechanism for rectifying 
miscarriages of justice. 
Conclusion
A very brief analysis of the history of miscarriages of justice was carried out by Lord Steyn in the 
House of Lords case of R v O’Conner and another and R v Mirza.143 He stated that:  
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‘Nowadays we know that the risk of a miscarriage of justice, a concept requiring no 
explanation is ever present. In earlier times courts sometimes approached the risk of a 
miscarriage of justice in ways which we would not nowadays find acceptable.’  
He referred to the fact that in 1980 the Court of Appeal denied the Birmingham Six the right to sue the 
police in civil proceedings citing Lord Denning MR’s now infamous comment that ‘this is such an 
appalling vista that every sensible person in the land would say: It cannot be right that these actions 
should go any further.’144 He also referred to Lord Devlin’s comment that the cases of the Birmingham 
Six, the Maguire Seven and the Guildford Four were ‘the greatest disasters that have shaken British 
justice in my time.’145 Lord Steyn referred to the RCCJ and the setting up of the CCRC and made 
reference to ‘a more general change in legal culture’ citing the case of R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Ex p Simms146 where, ‘in the face of some 60 miscarriages of justice in the 1990s, 
the House of Lords set aside Home Office instructions denying prisoners access to journalists in their 
efforts to get their convictions overturned.’ In Lord Steyn’s view: 
‘The philosophy became firmly established that there is a positive duty on judges, when things 
have gone seriously wrong in the criminal justice system, to do everything possible to put it 
right. In the world of today enlightened public opinion would accept nothing less. It would be 
contrary to the spirit of these developments to say that in one area, namely the deliberations 
of the jury, injustice can be tolerated as the price for protecting the jury system.’
While this is a laudable sentiment, the evidence in relation to criminal appeals in England and Wales 
would appear to show that injustice is being tolerated as the price for protecting the jury system. This 
article has sought to argue that the experiment of creating a court of review to rectify errors of fact has 
not worked as the review function precludes the criminal division of the Court of Appeal from delving 
too deeply into factual issues and the merits of the case. This prevents fresh evidence being freely 
admitted on appeal and lurking doubts being located which accounts for the low number of fresh 
evidence and lurking doubt appeals and the fact that they are rarely successful. The review function 
results in the Court assessing whether the jury ‘could’ have convicted and not whether the jury 
‘should’ have convicted which is arguably what the Court should be focusing on.
Giving the criminal division the power to rehear the case de novo in factual appeals would appear to 
solve many of the problems associated with the criminal division of the Court of Appeal but this would 
only be possible in a small number of cases because of practical considerations. It would also create 
major difficulties for both victims and witnesses and would have a huge impact in terms of resources. 
Therefore, a more preferable solution would be to give the criminal division the powers the civil 
division currently has which would also potentially solve many of the problems. Allowing the criminal 
division to have all the powers of the civil division may not provide a defendant with rights as 
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extensive as he would have if the appeal to the criminal division was heard de novo, but it would give 
the criminal division much more scope for rectifying miscarriages of justice than the current function of 
review allows. A more thorough investigation of the case on appeal would have an impact on the 
Court of Appeal in terms of workload and resources but if this proves to be a more effective 
mechanism for determining appeals then it could prove to be cost effective in the long run; if the 
appeals were dealt with satisfactorily first time round, it would prevent appeals continuously returning 
to the Court because the first appeal is often unsuccessful.147 A more effective mechanism for 
determining factual error appeals would also have a major impact on the workload of the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission as the majority of CCRC referrals to the Court of Appeal are those that 
have already been through the appeal process and have been unsuccessful. 
History has shown that changing the Court’s powers has made little change to the fundamental 
problems of the Court and unless these fundamental problems are addressed, history will continue to 
repeat itself with the Court’s powers continually being superficially amended in the hope that the Court 
will liberalise its approach in factual error appeals. Unless a fundamental legislative change is made 
to the criminal division’s function, miscarriages of justice will continue to go unidentified and 
uncorrected and the criminal division’s inconsistent, unpredictable and contradictory decision-making 
will continue. It is hoped that if the law of criminal appeals is to be changed in England and Wales, a 
much more thorough review is done of the function of the appeal Court so we do not just keep 
changing the Court’s powers in the hope of liberalising its approach as we have done in the past. It is 
also hoped that the Law Commission in Jersey do not just adopt the changes England and Wales 
have made to criminal appeals and also consider the function of the appeal Court as part of its review.
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